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TAXES, SOCIAL POLICY AND PHILANTHROPY:
THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF MIDDLE-
AND LOW-INCOME GENEROSITY
Alice Gresham Bullockt
He looked and saw rich people putting their gifts into the
treasury; he also saw a poor widow put in two small cop-
per coins. He said "Truly I tell you, this widow has put
in more than all of them; for all of them have contributed
out of their abundance, but she out of her poverty has put
in all she had to live on."1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, public attention has focused on two areas of poten-
tial policy reform: taxation and welfare. The two issues are inextricably
linked, and responsible reform requires considering the overlapping con-
sequences of change in both areas. Such reform is likely to have conse-
quences for the role of private philanthropy. As charities increasingly
assume responsibility for the public safety net, renewed attention should
focus on the appropriate tax treatment of individual charitable
contributions.
The current debate surrounding tax reform is primarily about
whether a consumption tax should replace our current income tax. Two
consumption tax bills have been introduced in Congress within the past
year: an Unlimited Savings Allowance 2 (USA) and a flat tax.3 The cur-
t Interim Dean and Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. I appreciate
the assistance of Melissa Wood, Christopher Agbee-Daries, Professor Michael Newsom, Pro-
fessor Reginald Robinson, Professor Dorothy Brown, and Professor Clifton Fleming.
1 Luke 21:1-4 (New Revised Standard Version).
2 S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995). This bill was introduced by Senators Pete Domenici (R-
N.M.), Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), and Bob Kerry (D-Neb.) on April 25, 1995. The USA combines a
flat-rate subtraction method value added tax which, in the proposal, is called the "business
tax," with a graduated tax on personal consumption which is called the "individual tax." For a
complete description of the Unlimited Savings Allowance proposal by its sponsors, see Paul
H. O'Neill & Robert A. Lutz, United Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAx NoTEs
1482 (1995) (Special Supplement).
3 H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1050, 104th Cong. (1995). These bills were intro-
duced on July 19, 1995, and were sponsored by House Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-
Tex.), Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.), and Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho). For a complete
description of the proposal see Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax, 68 TAx NoTEs
643 (1995) (Special Supplement).
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rent progressive income tax4 has been severely criticized. It has been
blamed for the decline in savings by American households - a phenom-
enon that has been correlated to the declining investment of American
businesses.5 The current system is also said to create economic disincen-
tives and diminish productivity. 6
Proponents of both the USA and flat tax proclaim the relative merits
of a consumption tax.7 The proposals for consumption tax are designed
to favor capital investment and encourage saving by eliminating the tax
on each activity.
Further, the debate over tax reform is made more complex by the
fact that our current system of taxation is not based purely on income
taxation.8 In promotion of numerous valuable goals - both economic
and social - it does not tax many items of income. Therefore, a major
part of the debate over tax reform involves which, if any, of the eco-
nomic and social goals should be achieved through deductions and exclu-
4 The progressive rate system can be contrasted with regressive and proportional tax
systems. Although the total amount of tax paid to the government may rise, fall, or remain
constant in a regressive system the rate of tax falls as income rises. Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation,
75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1908 (1987). See generally W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY
CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 3 (1953). In a progressive tax system, higher income indi-
viduals pay a higher percentage of their income in taxes than those with lower incomes. A
proportionate tax system - also known as a flat tax - requires all taxpayers to pay the same
rate of tax per each defined monetary unit, despite differences in the total income received. Id.
Regressive and proportionate taxes may be implemented through a marginal rate structure
like progressive taxes or through a combination of the marginal rate structure and cash pay-
ments. See generally Bankman & Griffith, supra. at 1945 (analysis of a model for implement-
ing progressive income tax not through a rising marginal rate structure, but through a
combination of "demogrants"' and constant or declining marginal rates to achieve an optimal
tax).
For an argument that apparent default assumption in favor of a proportionate tax is with-
out merit, see id. at 1909.
5 John S. Nolan, The Merit ofan Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 71 TAX Norms
1520, 1523 (1996).
6 But see Marjorie Kornbauser, The Rhetoric of Anti-Progressive Income Tax Move-
ment: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 465 (1987) (concluding that the arguments
against progressive taxation are overstated and based on an atomistic view of humanity; the
feminist view of humanity not only supports but also mandates some progressivity).
7 The political debate has focused less on the distinction between an income tax and a
consumption tax then it has on the desirability of a simple tax with flatter rates. The progres-
sive income tax is often described as too complex, inefficient, and unfair. It is said to en-
courage tax evasion and result in costly and complicated efforts to prevent tax evasion. Both
the USA and flat tax reform proposals claim to be fair, efficient, simple, and workable. Each
proposal is designed to broaden the tax base by allowing few or no exclusions and deductions,
thereby allowing the same revenue to be raised with lower rates. Proponents of the flat tax
even suggest that it could be "so simple and at such a low rate that we might even disband the
IRS." Nolan, supra note 5, at 1520.
8 See infra note 102 (explaining why the United States income tax system is not a
"pure" income tax).
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sions. For example, current deductions for charitable contributions9
support a huge network of socially desirable activities. Only the USA
tax reform proposal provides an allowance for gifts to private charity,
and it is in the form of a deduction.10
A. SHREDDING THE PUBLIC SAFETY NET
Political pressure to reform the federal tax system is almost as
strong as the current political efforts to eliminate the social benefits that
have been provided by the federal government since the New Deal." As
government funds for social and economic welfare are withdrawn, vital
"life support" for hundreds of thousands of American people hangs in the
balance.12 Changes in our tax and social systems, as well as the impact
of each one on the other, make it an appropriate time to reexamine the
justifications for providing a tax allowance for charitable gifts. 13 Such a
reexamination is especially important because the government expects
both individual and corporate contributors to fill the gap in the social and
9 Tax reform raises two direct challenges for charitable organizations and their donors.
First, will a replacement for the income tax exempt nonprofits to the extent the current rules
do, or will the new system shift some of the burden of raising revenue to nonprofits? Second,
will the new system offer incentives for charitable giving, and will these incentives be as
broadly based as the current incentives? This article addresses only the second question.
10 Much of the incentive for a charitable deduction may be lost under the USA Tax
because the wealthy can avoid taxes entirely by distributing the maximum amount in the pro-
posed unlimited IRA. Nolan, supra note 5, at 1521.
11 See generally NEwT GINGRICH Er AL., CONTRACT wiTH AMERICA (1994). As the offi-
cial legislative agenda of Congress in 1995, the "Contract with America" led to far-reaching
proposals to make fundamental changes in the way the government provides a safety net for
America's poor people. It generated legislation that cut Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, Medicaid, food stamps, housing, employment training, and other social programs. Id. at
65-77.
12 See Jason DeParle, Compassion Play: Less Is More; Faith and Facts in Welfare Re-
form, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3, 1995, at Al:
The liberal's War on Poverty has been an unmitigated disaster. While the govern-
ment has thrown trillions of dollars at the problem, the misery has only
grown ... No one likes the current system, which insults taxpayers and poor people
alike... fixing it for the long term requires money - to subsidize jobs and provide
child care to those required to take them.
See also Sarah Jay, The Neediest Cases, Government Safety Net Cut, Charities Turn to the
Public. N.Y. TiMs, Dec. 3, 1995, at 49:
A meals-on-wheels program has lost a New York City grant that paid for nursing
visits to homebound elderly. A social service program has lost city and state money
that paid a social worker to visit six day-care centers, looking for signs of child
abuse and neglect... Government efforts to overhaul poverty programs and balance
budgets have eroded the resources of the charities whose programs provide a safety
net for needy people ....
See generally JULIAN WOLPF.RT, WHAT CHARrIEs CAN AND CANNOT Do, A TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND REPORT (1996).
13 See Robert Carroll et al., Impact of Structured Tax Reform on Nonprofit Organiza-
tions, 95 TAX NoTEs 1785, 1793 (1995) (Federal budget cuts in education, welfare, and the
arts will put greater pressure on the nonprofit organizations to provide services).
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economic welfare of the poor and other philanthropic beneficiaries.' 4
Charitable organizations deliver a significant amount of governmentally
funded social benefits. 15
Even if the current tax system is not reformed, other factors warrant
another look at the propriety of the government's support for private
charity through the tax system, as well as an examination of the form that
support should take. A critical issue at the heart of the rhetoric of both
social and tax reform is how the American government should meet the
needs of its people - particularly those who have the least and are the
most vulnerable.
Beginning with the New Deal and continuing with the programs of
the Great Society, the federal government has continually expanded its
social welfare activities. This expansion slowed dramatically when, in
the 1980s, the Reagan administration reversed federal social policy. This
conservative federal policy continued during the Bush administration,
when it ordered budget cuts that fundamentally changed the reach and
focus of federal social programs.' 6 Now, in the 1996 proposed budget,
social welfare programs that aid lower income people the most will again
suffer the deepest reductions.' 7 Unfortunately, even greater need exists
today for services that aid families, children, and the elderly because the
federal government already reduced its support.' 8 And it is estimated
14 Constance Casey, Who Will Help the Helpers? Charity May Begin at Home But Not in
the House Under Newt Gingrich, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Jan. 22, 1995, at A4 (reporting
that Newt Gingrich said on the day he assumed leadership of the House of Representatives, "I
believe we should have a conscious strategy of dramatically increasing private charities"); Milt
Freudenheim, Charities Aiding Poor Fear Loss of Government Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1996, at B8 (reporting that Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes called for making it
"possible for private charity to become more involved").
15 Most charities themselvyes rely heavily on government money. Many government pro-
grams are arrangements which exchange government resources to nonprofit organizations for
the delivery of services through contracts and grants. The charity network is an arrangement
of organizations that range from neighborhood settlement houses to the Salvation Army and
the American Red Cross. All the organizations are run largely by professionals. Examples
include research grants awarded to nonprofit universities, job training for disadvantaged work-
ers who are under government contracts with community-based organizations like the Urban
League, and nonprofit hospitals whose patient care is paid by Medicaid and Medicare.
16 For discussion of the course and consequences of shifts in domestic policy that oc-
curred under the Reagan administration, see THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNING
OF AMERICA (Lester M. Salamon & Michael S. Lund eds., 1984).
17 Virginia A. Hodgkinson et al., The 100 Nonprofit Organizations Study, in THE IMPACT
OF FEDERAL BUDGET PROPOSALS UPON THE Ac-ivTIEs OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE PEOPLE THEY SERVE 3, 9-10 (Independent Sector ed., 1995).
18 WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 12 (stating that Medicaid cuts could eliminate coverage
for 4.4 million children and deny assistance to more than 16,000 homeless children by 2002);
Constance Casey, Cuts Leave Charities Wondering Where Next Meal Comes From, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 22, 1995, at Al (quoting Glenn Bailey: "As more people become ineligible for
welfare, we'll have fewer resources and more to do."). See also Casey, supra note 14, at A4
(reporting that Scott Schaefer, director of an organization that reclaims and distributes surplus
food, "worries that there will be a lot more people to feed and an increase in the number of
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that a 120 percent increase in charitable contributions will be needed in
2002 to make up for the projected gap in government support. 19 The
history of charitable giving in America suggests that even if people in-
crease their donations substantially, such growth cannot fill the gap.20
As a result, charitable organizations will be forced to offer fewer services
unless new sources of revenue materialize to cover the gap in federal
funding.
The questions that are central to social reform are whether the fed-
eral government will: (1) continue to promote the general welfare of all
its people; (2) encourage people to become self-reliant; 21 and (3) en-
courage people to contribute to the well-being of those in need. There is
little question that severe budget cuts to social programs will inundate
charities with more people who need assistance to survive. Where will
the money come from, charities are asking, to save those people from
starvation, illness, or death?22 "And how, [charities] ask, are they ex-
pected to take up the slack when close to half of their budgets come from
the government, much of that in the form of direct grants for services like
foster care or elderly care?" 23 Some commentators believe that the gov-
ernment cannot lay the responsibility for caring for its people on the pri-
vate sector.24 However, many see welfare reform as the shock treatment
needed to end welfare dependency. The idea is that such a dramatic
change provides an impetus for finding new ways of helping people es-
cape poverty.25 "While the cornerstones of American charity today [may
not] be built on neighbors caring for neighbors in tight little communi-
ties,"26 policies must be created that help raise money for charities, sup-
port people's sense of self-reliance, and, at the same time, support
homeless people" and that "the number of people on the margins will be pushed into
poverty").
19 Hodgkinson et al., The Impact of Reductions of Federal Funding on the Independent
Sector in TiH IMPACT OF FEDERAL BUDGEr PROPOSALS UPON THE Acrxvrrms OF CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PEOPLE THEY SERVICE 305, 306 (Independent Sector ed., 1995).
20 See MARC BENEDICK & PHYLLIS LEVINSON, PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES OR PUBLIC
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS? 462-70 (1990) (describing empirical research tracing charitable con-
tributions per capita for twenty-eight years (1955-1983) after adjusting for inflation). The
long-term trend reflected substantial growth in charitable contributions, with the 1983 level
85.8 percent higher than the 1955 level. The rate of increase outstripped total incomes per
capita which grew by only 58.7 percent during the same period. It is also important to note
that "increases in private giving coincided with growth in total federal expenditures per capita,
which rose 125 percent over the same period."
21 See generally Patricia Williams, Editorial, The Saints of Servitude, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
13, 1996, at 13.
22 Casey, supra note 14, at A4.
23 Id.
24 Id
25 Id.
26 See Private Money Can't Fill The Welfare Gap, Charities Say, SUNDAY GAZETTE
MAIL, June 4, 1995, at AS.
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people's sense of responsibility to others. The tax system can help pro-
vide the incentive to find new ways to help people help themselves. 27
B. THE UPSIDE-DOWN SUBSIDY
The current tax deduction for gifts to charity is troublesome and
persistently criticized. 28 The tax system currently provides a deduction
for private gifts to qualified charitable organizations. 29 However, gifts to
individuals who deserve charity 30 are not deductible. The cost of giving
to charity becomes cheaper only as the taxpayer's income rises, and tax-
payers must be able to itemize in order to take the charitable deduction. 31
An individual in a 15 percent tax bracket pays eighty-five cents for each
dollar given to charity, while an individual in the 33 percent tax bracket
only pays sixty-seven cents for the same one dollar gift. This upside-
down subsidy gives the most tax benefit to those who need it the least.32
Moreover, a taxpayer who cannot itemize deductions pays the full dollar
for the gift of a dollar. The result of this system is that people with high
incomes decide which activities will "receive" public dollars through
their charitable contributions. 33
This article argues, on tax and social policy grounds, for continuing
to grant a tax allowance to individuals who contribute to charity. How-
ever, this practice should not continue in the form of the current deduc-
tion. Rather, this article argues for extending the allowance to middle
and lower income taxpayers who, as a group, cannot take the current
deduction. I premise this argument on the belief that where the federal
government denies an allowance for gifts to charity by individuals who
do not itemize their deductions, it violates the principle of distributional
equity.34 Evidence exists that middle- and low-income individuals -
like high-income individuals - are sensitive to the cost of giving and
should, therefore, have the same available tax allowance. In addition,
27 Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under An Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L.
REv. 679 (1988) (explaining that personal deductions are sometimes based on whether they
encourage sound social or economic policy unrelated to tax policy considerations).
28 Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substi-
tute for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REv. 377, 395-96 (1992). See also Mark G.
Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and
Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. Rv. 831 (1979).
29 See infra note 39 and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified charities.
30 Someone who is poverty-stricken, for example.
31 See infra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of requirements to itemize
deductions.
32 See The Donee Group, Private Philanthropy: Vital & Innovative? or Passive & Irrel-
evant?, in Research Papers 49, 72 (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs &
United States Department of Treasury ed., 1977).
33 Kelman, supra note 28, at 856-58.
34 Distributional equity is a concept of fairness which requires that similarly situated
taxpayers be treated the same.
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this article argues that when the federal government does not allow a tax
deduction for middle- and lower-income individuals, it unfairly grants
power and influence to high-income individuals to determine which
charities are worthy of support. Moreover, denying tax relief to such a
large segment 35 of the American people is plutocratic36 and ignores the
reality of the millions of Americans who pay taxes and can - and do -
contribute significantly to charitable activities. In addition, tax relief for
private gifts to charity by middle- and lower-income groups of taxpayers
could encourage and affirm the work of volunteers who build and sustain
institutions within their own communities that reduce problems of pov-
erty, unemployment, and illiteracy.
Finally, this article discusses alternatives to the current deduction,
including matching grants, nonitemizer deduction, a refundable credit,
and a nonrefundable credit for gifts to qualified poverty relief organiza-
tions. It concludes that a refundable credit for gifts to charity is the supe-
rior solution, for it satisfies concerns about both equity and efficiency. A
refundable credit will increase gifts to organizations that are expected to
bridge the gap in the government's spending on social welfare.
II. TAX TREATMENT OF PRIVATE CHARITY
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 501(c) exempts from in-
come and transfer taxation the income of and the contributions received
by qualified charitable organizations. 37 A tax deduction for gifts to a
qualified charity has been permitted since 1917 when the federal govern-
ment enacted legislation that protected private philanthropy from the im-
pact of wartime tax rates.38 In contrast, gifts to individuals - even
needy, poor individuals - are not deductible. Only gifts to qualified
organizations that are defined as charitable organizations39 by the Inter-
35 See infra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the number of taxpayers
who take the standard deduction and for a discussion of charitable donors who have no taxable
income.
36 See WALLACE MENDELSON, CAPITALISM, DamocRAcY AND THE SUPREME COURT 1-18
(1960) (arguing that plutocracy has always ruled this country).
37 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1996) provides that exempt organizations include "[c]orporations,
and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes ......
Under § 511, unrelated business income of a charitable organization is taxed.
38 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). Under this act, deduct-
ible contributions could be made to corporations or associations organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies that are
organized for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
39 In 1993, the Internal Revenue Service classified 1,118,131 organizations as tax-ex-
empt. Of those, 575,690 were deemed "charities" under § 501(c)(3). ANN E. KAPLAN, AMERI-
CAN ASS'N OF FUNDRAISING COUNSEL TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY, GIVING USA 1995 30
(1995) [hereinafter GIVING USA 1995].
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nal Revenue Service are deductible.40 It is significant that the Code
makes no distinction between charitable organizations that provide pub-
lic goods 4 1 and those that benefit the poor directly.42 This model of tax-
favored philanthropy ignores the centuries-old patterns of giving prac-
ticed by a number of racial and ethnic minorities in the United States.
The model also does nothing to encourage or affirm the needed giving of
many American taxpayers, who may give only to individuals or to orga-
nizations that serve the poor.4 3
Nonprofit institutions have come to play a major role - in partner-
ship with governments - in providing a variety of public services. 44
Health, human and social services, colleges and universities, the arts, and
community activities rely heavily on voluntary services. 45 In 1995, liv-
ing people contributed $143.9 billion to support charitable and religious
organizations - 11% more than in 1994.46 These individuals contribute
about 88 percent of the money charities raise.47 Myriad reasons motivate
people to give. Because charitable contributions have a net cost even for
taxpayers in the highest tax bracket, the motive is not exclusively tax-
related. People also give because they are attached to a particular activ-
ity, cause, or institution, or because they have sense of social obliga-
tion.48 While taxes may not be the primary motivation for charitable
giving, they clearly affect the timing,49 volume, 50 and distribution of
these gifts.
40 The deduction is codified at I.R.C. § 170. A charitable contribution is defined as a gift
or contribution to "[A] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation created or
organized in the United States .... " I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A) (1996).
41 See Peter J. Wiedenback, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L.
REV. 85, 94 (1985) (services provided by charitable organizations are in the nature of public
goods).
42 See, e.g., John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private Charity: A Tax Policy Perspec-
tive, 3 VA. TAx REv. 229, 234-36 (1984).
43 See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text describing ethnic giving practices.
44 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
45 Hodgkinson et al., supra note 19, at 305 ($435 billion existed in the nonprofit sector in
1992, the major sources of which were government, 36.7 percent; private contributions, 9.3
percent; dues fees and charges and all other revenue, 54.0 percent).
46 John Marawski, A Banner Year for Giving, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 30, 1996, at
1. In 1995, corporate gifts totaled $7.4 billion. Id.
47 Id. at 27.
48 For a summary of empirical findings relevant to understanding of altruistic behavior,
see Bruce Bolnick, Toward a Behavioral Theory of Philanthropic Activity, in ALTRUISM, Mo-
RALrrY AND ECONOMiC THEORY 197, 201-16 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975).
49 Marawski, supra note 46, at 27 (reporting that the strong performance of the stock
market in 1995 accounted for increased donations by donors of appreciated securities because
they could obtain bigger tax savings).
50 Id. (reporting that 1985 was a banner year for giving). The debate on flatter tax rates
"may have motivated some donors to give while taxes were at their current rates - and larger
deductions remained intact." Id. See also WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 28 (estimating that if
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Taxes can affect charitable contributions because they affect after-
tax income and the net dollar cost of giving. For a taxpayer who item-
izes, the deductibility of a charitable gift reduces the after-tax cost of
contributing a dollar to less than one dollar. If the taxpayer's marginal
rate is 39 percent, a donation to charity costs the taxpayer only 61 cents
because 39 cents would have been paid in taxes in the absence of the gift.
Higher tax rates, therefore, encourage giving because they affect the cost
of giving.51 The practical effect of the current deduction is that a one
dollar gift costs eighty-five cents for a family with a taxable income of
$25,000, but only 69 cents for a family with a taxable income of
$100,000.52 For a family that does not itemize its deductions, the cost of
the one dollar gift is the full dollar. If contributions are deductible, mak-
ing a gift reduces tax liability, and the after-tax cost of giving one dollar
costs less than a dollar.
Currently, only taxpayers who itemize deductions receive a tax ben-
efit for their gifts to charity. Of the 114,964,937 tax returns that were
filed in 1994, there were only 33,017,75453 - about 29 percent -
which itemized. Roughly two-thirds of all individual taxpayers cannot
itemize either because they have insufficient taxable income or because
their deductions do not exceed the zero-bracket amount plus exemptions.
In 1994, 81,947,18254 taxpayers claimed the standard deduction. 55 This
number means that many middle-income and few low-income individu-
als itemized their deductions.5 6 The itemized deduction is virtually the
the deduction were eliminated, donations would shrink by one-third or $20 billion among the
32 million taxpayers who itemize deductions).
51 But higher tax rates could also discourage giving by lowering after tax income.
52 These figures are for cash gifts.
53 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 180 (1996).
54 Id.
55 I.R.C. § 63(b) defines the taxable income of an individual who does not itemize as
adjusted gross income minus the standard deduction and the personal exemption of section
151. The adjusted gross income represents gross income minus business expenses, expenses
attributable to the production of rent or royalty income, the allowed capital loss deduction, and
certain personal expenses. A standard deduction is the minimum allowed to individual taxpay-
ers as a deduction from adjusted gross income in arriving at taxable income and is designed to
serve as an allowance for a certain level of personal expenses, including charitable contribu-
tions. Thus, only itemizers are permitted a deduction for charitable contributions. I.R.C.
§ 63(b)(1996).
The standard deduction was introduced in 1944 to reduce the need for individual record
keeping. The deduction has slowly increased over the years to $5,000 for married couples and
$3,000 for singles and of zero on the first $5,000 of taxable income.
56 Martin A. Sullivan, The Average Tax Return: $25,000 and No Deductions, 71 TAX
NOTES 1409 (1996).
There are two tiers of itemized deductions for individuals. Those deductions in the first
tier are not subject to the 2% floor of I.R.C. § 67. Any deductions not specifically exempted
from the impact of section 67 are treated as tier two deductions and are deductible only to the
extent that they cumulatively exceed 2% of adjusted gross income. The charitable contribution
deduction is a tier one deduction.
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exclusive "domain of upper-middle income and upper-income taxpay-
ers." 57 In 1993, 80,840,91658 of 113,662,38059 individuals took the stan-
dard deduction. 1993 income tax statistics reveal that $100.6 billion was
donated in that year.60 More than 78.2 percent of that amount came from
the 35.6 percent of all tax return filers who regularly contribute to char-
ity.6 ' 60.8 percent of those regular contributors itemize, while 21.8 per-
cent regularly contribute but are in the lower-income range and could not
itemize deductions.62 17.4 percent of the regular contributors sometimes
itemize and sometimes take the standard deduction.63 The end result:
The charities of more than 10 percent of individuals who did not earn
enough to file a tax return did not get a subsidy. 64
It is clear, then, that millions of middle- and low-income taxpayers
who make charitable contributions do not receive the benefit of a tax
deduction.
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR TAx ALLOWANCE
Literature on justifications for and against a tax deduction for pri-
vate charity is abundant. 65 Essentially, the arguments that favor the tax
allowance are based on the belief that it is wise public policy to en-
courage the creation and growth of philanthropic institutions. First, the
deduction 66 is an efficient subsidy for public goods.67 Second, it pro-
57 Id.
58 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 53, at 180.
59 See id.
60 GIVING USA 1995, supra note 39, at 47. Total giving for 1993 has been estimated at
$101.2 billion. Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Some might argue that denying a charitable contribution deduction to poor individuals
who do not file tax returns does not constitute discrimination because non-filers are not tax-
payers and are therefore not similarly situated to wealthy taxpayers who benefit from the
deduction. A more reasoned approach, however, would compare the after-tax dollar cost of
charitable donations for both wealthy and poor individuals and conclude that poor individuals
must pay more for the contributions they make.
65 See generally Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching
Grants?, 28 TAx L. REv. 37 (1972); Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contri-
butions: Part I - Aggregate and Distributional Effects, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81 (1975); Martin
Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II - The Impact on Religious,
Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209 (1975); Mark P. Gergen, The
Case For A Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988); Todd Izzo, A
Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 2371 (1993); McDaniel, supra note 28; John K. McNulty, Public Policy and Private
Charity: A Tax Policy Perspective, 3 VA. TAx REV. 229 (1984); Wiedenback, supra note 41;
Kelman, supra note 28.
66 There is much debate about the efficacy of a deduction as the appropriate form for the
subsidy. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
67 Gergen, supra note 65, at 1396.
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motes cultural pluralism. 68 Third, a gift to private charity is not within
the definition of income.69
B. TAX SUBSIDY FOR PRIVATE CHARITY
The charitable tax deduction is premised on the idea that charities
provide goods and services that the government cannot or does not want
to administer, but nevertheless considers deserving of the government's
support. The belief is that without a government subsidy, public goods
and services would be under-funded or not funded at all because some
people would refuse to pay for a good and instead rely on the other peo-
ple who do - a phenomenon characterized as the "free rider" problem.70
It is also true that there is no market to set a price for such public goods
and that donors may under-give because they undervalue the collective
good. Another often cited reason for under-giving is that the giver may
miscalculate or undervalue collective goods because she does not recog-
nize its secondary benefits to society. She may not recognize, for exam-
ple, that education produces an informed, educated electorate and
supports a skilled labor force.71 Subsidizing education promotes partici-
pation in democracy and workplace efficiency. Therefore, society bene-
fits from subsidized education.
It has been suggested that private charity responds better than the
government to the varied demands for public goods. 72 A tax subsidy for
private funding may be the most efficient way for a high-preference mi-
nority - faced with a disinterested majority - to fund the good at the
desired level.73 This argument implicitly suggests that without a tax sub-
sidy, a high-preference minority will not voluntarily redistribute its
wealth through charitable gifts at the required level.
Support for the tax subsidy is often founded on the theory that giv-
ing is a form of pleasure that would be lost if the donor were forced to
68 Izzo, supra note 65, at 2393.
69 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions In An Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV.
309, 346 (1972).
70 Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, 30 NAT'L TAx J. 1, 2 (1977). A free-rider is anyone who enjoys the benefit of a
good or service without paying its cost. Id.
71 See generally THmODORE ScmL"z, HUMAN CAPIrrAL 24-47 (1971).
72 Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward A Theory of A Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-
Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTrTmONS 21 (Susan Rose-Ackerman
ed., 1986). See also BENEDICK & LEVINSON, supra note 20, at 470-76.
73 Political systems harbor biases based upon predominate values, beliefs, rituals, and
institutional procedures which operate consistently and systematically to the benefit of certain
persons and groups and to the disadvantage of others. See generally PETER BACHRACH &
MORTON S. BARArZ, PowER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1970). This truth is
amply demonstrated in the politics that have been shifting the focus of government away from
providing social benefits for a growing minority of poor people in this country.
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pay for public goods through the market or a tax.74 The allowance is
also said to promote unselfish behavior.75
C. CULTURAL PLURALISM
Private charity often supports socially desirable activities that are
provided for neither by the government nor the market. "The deduction
encourages [cultural] pluralism by permitting an assortment of social
services; taxpayers are allowed in part to vote with their dollars, rather
than by the one-person, one-vote system that establishes . . . budget
priorities." 76
D. TAX ALLOWANCE SUPPORTED BY INTERNAL LOGIC OF TAx CODE
The internal logic of the tax code supports the current subsidy for
charitable gifts. For example, there would be no reason for a section 501
exemption of the taxable income and gifts received by a charitable or-
ganization 77 if no allowance were permitted for contributions to such
qualified organizations. The exemption suggests "a policy judgment that
income arising in the private sector devoted to designated charitable pur-
poses should not be burdened by an income tax."78 It appears that, at a
minimum, the exemption indicates that income of a charity allocated to
certain charitable purposes should not be burdened by the income tax. 79
But it is also possible that the exemption reflects a judgment that such
income does not represent "consumption" and should therefore be ex-
cluded from the tax base.80
As much as possible, the tax result should be the same whether one
contributes property, cash or services. A gift of services is not deducti-
ble,81 but a gift of cash or property is. In neither case, however, is the
donee taxed upon the receipt.82 And in the case of a contribution of
services, the donor is not taxed on the imputed income for the market
value of the charitable services she rendered.83 The unstated exclusion
of imputed income that is derived from the gift of services seems to pro-
74 See PAUL FRiERE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 25-51 (1993) (calling this compul-
sion "false generosity").
75 But see infra notes 121-39 and accompanying text that discusses the expectation of
reciprocal benefit.
76 Wiedenback, supra note 41, at 97.
77 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
78 McNulty, supra note 42, at 232 (citation to I.R.C. omitted).
79 Id.
80 Andrews, supra note 69, at 309.
81 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g)(as amended in 1990).
82 I.R.C. § 102(a) (1996).
83 McNulty, supra note 42, at 239. Ostensibly, there is nothing in the Internal Revenue
Code that precludes taxing the value of services that are contributed to a charitable organiza-
tion. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(c)(as amended in 1995).
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vide symmetry to the deduction that is allowed the donor of cash or prop-
erty. Thus, the tax law makes the choice to contribute services, cash, or
property tax neutral.
E. A GIFr TO CHARITY Is EXCLUDABLE FROM THE TAX BASE
The charitable deduction is sometimes justified as necessary to ac-
curately measure taxable income because the amount donated to charity
is not available for savings or personal consumption.8 4 Taxable income
would be overstated without a deduction. The theory is that the income
taxes "divert economic resources away from personal consumption and
accumulation" to public use.8 5 Thus, only the consumption of resources
which divert "economic resources away from other people should be
measured in assessing income taxes."86 Charitable donations divert re-
sources not to private, but public use. Thus, charitable gifts are not
within the Haig-Simons definition of income.87
I. DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY AND THE PROGRESSIVE
RATE STRUCTURE
Commentators have severely criticized the current deduction for
charitable contributions in part because it benefits most those who need it
the least.88 A progressive income tax system raises tax rates as income
rises.89 The current progressive income tax rate structure and the charita-
ble deduction create the upside-down subsidy. 90
While the progressive rate structure is currently under siege, 91 it has
been part of the federal income tax system since its inception in 1913.92
However, it has long been controversial. In the words of John Stuart
Mill, progressive income taxation is nothing more than "graduated rob-
84 See Andrews, supra note 69, at 312. But see generally Kelman, supra note 28, at 831-
58 (disagreeing with Andrews's definition of the appropriate tax base and believing that "a
taxpayer's net receipts, receipts minus the cost of obtaining the receipts, tautologically consists
of consumption plus savings"). According to the widely accepted definition of Robert Haig
and Henry Simons, income is personal consumption plus changes in wealth for a specific
period of time. See Robert Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects, in
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1,7 (Robert Haig ed., 1921); HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME
TAXATION 50 (1938).
85 Andrews, supra note 69, at 325.
86 Id. at 356.
87 I.
88 See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the upside-down subsidy.
89 I.R.C. § 1 (1996).
90 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
91 See supra notes 4-5 and the accompanying text that explains the criticism surrounding
progressive income taxation.
92 Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166 (1913).
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bery."93 What has permitted such a maligned system of taxation to exist
for more than one hundred years, despite its economic disincentives, high
cost, and complexity? The answer: An overriding concern for distribu-
tional equity.94
Progressive taxation is said to promote distributional equity.95 The
progressive rate structure theoretically corrects financial inequality that is
created by income maldistribution. 96 The justification is that the wealthy
will lose less from sharing than the less wealthy will gain from receiv-
ing.97 In addition, the equity of a progressive rate minimizes gross ine-
quality in opportunity. 98
In theory, the progressive rate structure is a means of achieving rela-
tive equality.99 One of the goals of the tax system is to reduce economic
93 Richard Joseph, Why Progressive Taxation?, 70 TAX NOTES 313, 313 (1996) (quoting
John Stuart Mill). See also Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4; Edwin R.A. Seligman, Pro-
gressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 AM. ECON. Ass'N Q. 1 (1908); Walter J. Blum,
Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60 TAXES 16 (1982); BLUM & KAIVEN,
supra note 4; Harold M. Groves, Toward a Social Theory of Progressive Taxation, 9 NAT'L
TAX J. 27 (1956); Joel Slemrod, Do We Know How Progressive The Income Tax System
Should Be?, 36 NAT'L TAX J. 361 (1993); Dan Throop Smith, High Progressive Tax Rates:
Inequity and Immorality?, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 451 (1968).
94 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 1910 (all tax rate structures must be pre-
mised upon and measured by a theory of distributive justice); Joseph, supra note 93, at 313
("Equity is the key... for no system so patently 'inequitable' would have been tolerated by so
egalitarian a people."). But see Jay M. Howard, When Two Tax Theories Collide: A Look At
The History and Future of Progressive and Proportionate Personal Income Taxation, 32
WASHBURN LJ. 43 n.263 (1992) (citing ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, 1988 COMMISSION SURVEY - CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS AND
TAXES (1988), which indicates that the public perceives the income tax to be the least fair of
all taxes).
95 Joseph, supra note 93, at 317. But see BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 4, at 74-78
(rejecting the argument that welfare would be improved by redistributing wealth from the rich
to the poor); W. Allen Wallis, The Case For Progressive Taxation, Easy or Uneasy?, in IN-
COME REDISTRIBUTION 135 (Colen Campbell ed.. 1977); James Gwarthy & James Long, Is the
Flat Tax A Radical Idea?, 5 CATO J. 407, 413 (1985) (suggesting that annual income is not a
sound measure for economic "well-being").
96 See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 1915 ("[W]elfarist theories of distributive
justice permit taxation either to finance public goods or to redistribute income, if the well-
being of individuals in society is improved."); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 277-78
(1971) (arguing that one reason for the progressive tax is to level unequal distributions of
wealth that result from gifts and bequests; such unequal distributions are undesirable because
they lead to disparate political power).
The seven generally accepted criteria for assessing the tax structure are whether it: (1)
supplies adequate revenue; (2) achieves a practical and workable system of income; (3) im-
poses equal taxes upon those who enjoy equal income; (4) assists in achieving economic sta-
bility; (5) reduces economic inequality; (6) avoids impairment of the market-oriented
economy; and (7) accomplishes a high degree of harmony between the income tax and the
political order. Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV.
567, 568-97 (1965).
97 BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 4, at 75.
98 See id. at 77-79.
99 See Joseph, supra note 93, at 318.
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inequality and redistribute income and wealth to more disadvantaged
members of society. 100 Redistribution is founded on the principle that
individuals should pay taxes based on their ability to pay.1 1 While the
progressive rate structure is designed so that the wealthy pay a higher
percentage of their income in taxes, the tax rate does not reflect the ac-
tual distribution of the tax burden.1 02 Because the per-dollar tax savings
for charitable contributions rise as one's marginal rate rises, high income
taxpayers enjoy a proportionally larger tax deduction than lower income
taxpayers. In other words, the price of giving becomes cheaper and
cheaper as income increases.
The price of charitable giving is the net after-tax cost for the donor
per dollar of donation.103 To determine the impact of the tax deduction
on charitable behavior, researchers have focused on the elasticity of char-
itable contributions. 10 4 If the absolute value of price elasticity1 05 is
greater than one, the charitable deduction induces more in donations than
the amount the Treasury foregoes in revenue. On the other hand, if the
absolute value of price elasticity is less than one, the deduction is not
considered worthwhile because it does not tend to generate additional
contributions.1 06
It is generally accepted that the incentive tax effect of the charitable
contributions deduction is relatively high for high-income taxpayers.107
Commentators have routinely argued that low- and middle-income givers
are not responsive to the price of giving 08 (that is, charitable behavior of
low- and middle-income individuals is not affected by tax incentives).
100 See BLUM & KALVEN, supra note 93, at 18-19. For a discussion of taxation and con-
siderations of redistributing wealth, see McNulty, supra note 42, at 247-51.
101 Joseph, supra note 93, at 315-17. See also WuiLtAm KLEIN, Poucy ANALYSIS OFTHE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 14-20 (1976).
102 Congress defines taxable income to exclude many items included in the economic
definition of income. Income set aside in qualified retirement plans is not taxed to the em-
ployee until withdrawn. Taxable income currently does not include owner-occupied home
mortgage interest, employer-provided health insurance, disability insurance, or certain taxes.
In addition, the rate structure does not take into account the amount of benefits individuals of
different income classes receive from public services such as national defense, the judiciary,
education, and health services.
For a discussion of conceptual problems related to defining "income," see A.B. ATIrN-
SON. TmE ECONOMICS OF INEQuALrrY 35-60 (1983).
103 Yong S. Choe & Jinook Jeong, Charitable Contributions by Low- and Middle-Income
Taxpayers: Further Evidence With A New Method, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 33 (1993).
104 CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL INCOME TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING
274 (1985).
105 Price elasticity is the donor's responsiveness to the after-tax cost of giving.
106 CLoTF-LTER, supra note 104, at 281.
107 Choe & Jeong, supra note 103, at 1. See also CLoTEELTER, supra note 104, at 57-59.
108 See Henry Aaron, Federal Encouragement of Private Giving, in TAX IMPACrS ON
PHIANTHROPY 210-11 (Tax Institute of America ed., 1972); Gerald Auten & Gabriel Rudney,
Charitable Deductions and Tax Reform: New Evidence on Giving Behavior, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SEVENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 1984 73-82 (National Tax Association &
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Consistent with this theory, no tax relief is provided for low- and middle-
income taxpayers who cannot itemize deductions.10 9 However, empiri-
cal studies support the view that the charitable behavior of low- and mid-
dle-income taxpayers is affected by the price of giving. 110 The
contradictory conclusions about the effect of tax incentives on middle-
and low-income taxpayers are a function of bias inherent in the models
used for estimating the effect of the tax deduction."' It appears that
when adjustments are made to eliminate this identified bias, the findings
support the conclusions that the charitable behavior of low- and middle-
income taxpayers is indeed sensitive to the tax incentive. 112 Indeed, a
recent study concludes that the actual charitable giving behavior of
Tax Institute of America eds., 1984); C. HARRY KAHN, NATIONAL BUR. OF ECON. RESEARCH,
PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 72 (1960).
109 A small above-the-line deduction was available to nonitemizers from 1982 to 1986.
The deduction was 25% of total contributions limited to $100 ($50 for married people filing
separately) in 1982-83, and $300 ($150 for married people filing separately) in 1984. The full
deduction was supposed to take effect in 1986. It was eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of
1986. For an explanation of the repeal of the nonitemizer deduction, see Ronald A. Pearlman,
Repeal of the Charitable Contribution For Nonitemizers Explained, 28 TAX NOTES 1140
(1985) ("While the proposal to repeal the nonitemizer deduction may have some adverse effect
on the amount of charitable giving, we believe that contributions by nonitemizers, who gener-
ally have relatively low marginal rates, are not affected significantly by tax considerations.").
See also Charles T. Clotfelter, Impact of Charitable Giving: 1989 Perspective, in Do TAXES
MATTER? 203, 223 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990).
110 Michael J. Boskin & Martin Feldstein, Effects of Charitable Deduction on Contribu-
tions by Low Income and Middle Income Households: Evidence From the National Survey of
Philanthropy, 50 REv. ECON. & STAT. 351-54 (1978); Eleanor Brown, Tax Incentives and
Charitable Giving: Evidence from New Survey Data, 15 PuB. FIN. Q. 386-96 (1987); Jerald
Schiff, Does Government Spending Crowd Out Charitable Contributions?, 38 NAT'L TAX J.
535-46 (1985). See also William A. Luksetich & Nasser Daneshvary, Prices of Giving, In-
come Sources and Declared Contributions (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Asso-
ciation for Research on Nonprofit Associations and Voluntary Actions (ARNOVA), San
Francisco, 1994).
111 Brown, supra note 110, at 387-89 (suggesting that the "itemization effect" that reflects
non-random selection in tax data that contains both itemizing and nonitemizing households is
the problem); Choe & Jeong, supra note 103, at 34 ("To answer the question of why these
studies produce such different results, it should be noted that there are two statistical problems
in the estimation of the price elasticities .... "); John R. Robinson, Estimates of the Price
Elasticity of Charitable Giving: A Reappraisal Using 1985 Itemizer and Nonitemizer Charita-
ble Deduction Data, 12 J. AM. TAX'N ASSOC. 39, 56-57 (1990) (asserting that the significant
differences in price elasticities between itemizers and nonitemizers indicates misspecification
of the traditional demand equation; there may be several reasons for the misspecification,
including income differences, the ability to itemize deductions, or the reporting behavior of
taxpayers). "Itemizers have a tax incentive to keep track of their gifts, while nonitemizers do
not. This could lead to systematic difference in self-reported levels of giving." Brown, supra,
at 387-89. Another possible explanation is that in low- and moderate-income data samples, a
high proportion report zero gifts that estimation techniques do not account for, resulting in the
non-negativity constraint that builds up observations at zero giving. Id.
For a complete discussion of prior studies and their contradictory findings, see Robinson,
supra.
112 Choe & Jeong, supra note 103, at 108; Robinson, supra note 11, at 56-57. See also
Brown, supra note 110, at 394.
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nonitemizers was no different from the behavior of taxpayers who
itemize. 1 13
Relying on empirical evidence, Yong S. Choe and Jinook Jeong ar-
gue that when research is focused on the after-tax cost of the giving of
middle- and low-income individuals, their behavior differs little from the
behavior of high-income individuals. It thus makes little sense to deny
middle- and low-income taxpayers the same benefit that is enjoyed by
high-income charitable givers."14 Granting any different degree of relief
egregiously violates the equity principle because it has also been shown
that middle- and low-income individuals actually contribute a greater
percentage of their income"15 for redistributive purposes. For low-in-
come individuals, the sacrifice is greater.
Denying the deduction in the face of evidence that middle- and
some low-income individuals respond to the tax incentive has been typi-
cally justified because "some inequality is the inevitable consequence of
progressive taxation."116 This justification, however, lacks persuasive
merit. Refusing a deduction entirely to these groups breaches a basic
tenet of the progressive rate structure. Rather than resolving the issue,
policy makers simply grant no tax relief for charitable gifts that are made
by less affluent individuals. "It is as if in choosing a tax structure, the
polity were a lost traveler faced with a selection of equally trodden paths.
Lacking any convincing rationale to turn right or left, the traveler contin-
ues on the path that leads straight ahead." 117
113 Robinson, supra note 111, at 57-58 (stating that after correcting for reporting behav-
ior, nonitemizer charitable behavior was indiscernible from itemizer behavior). See also WoL-
PERT, supra note 12, at 28 (stating that evidence shows that the donations among the 81 million
nonitemizers slowed substantially after the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated the
nonitemizer deduction, especially among middle-income households).
114 Choe & Jeong, supra note 103, at 38 (stating that, if middle- and low-income taxpay-
ers have the same price sensitivity as high-income taxpayers to the cost of giving, "the distri-
butional equity problem may be more serious when a deduction is denied for contributions
made by [middle- and low-income] taxpayers"). See generally, Brown, supra note 110. Cf.
Robinson, supra note 111, at 56-58 (stating that the results of the study generally suggest the
"charitable deduction may be an efficient subsidy only for high-income [in excess of
$100,000] taxpayers and that relatively little additional giving is tax-induced for middle and
low income taxpayers"; future research into an "estimation of the demand for charitable giving
should take into account the possibility that the charitable giving or reporting behavior may be
different for nonitemizers and itemizers").
115 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
116 Michael J. Boskin, Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 26, 27
(1976). " he differing rates of subsidy are merely an inevitable by-product of the progressive
rate structure itself'); CLOTFELTER, supra note 104, at 285 (citing generally Richard E. Wag-
ner, Death Taxes and Charitable Bequests: A Survey of Issues and Options, in RESEARCH
PAPERS 2337-52 (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Department of
Treasury ed., 1977)). The differing subsidy rates based on income exist because "the rate of
subsidy tends to rise with income because the marginal rate rises with income." Id.
117 Bankman & Griffith, supra note 4, at 1914 (using this metaphor when discussing
explanations for the default assumption that favors a proportionate tax over a progressive tax).
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IV. THE DEDUCTION RESULTS IN UNFAIR ALLOCATION OF
POWER AND INFLUENCE
A. DECIDING WHICH CHARITIES ARE FUNDED
Decisions about federal funding for public goods are usually made
by Congress among competing interests. But a very large percentage of
wealth is redistributed through a charitable tax deduction that permits
individuals to choose how to distribute the public's money. The individ-
ual chooses by deciding to which charitable activities to contribute. This
type of indirect support for charitable organizations permits a donor to
exercise "a form of self-government ... that parallels, complements and
enriches the democratic electoral process itself."11 8 The donor is essen-
tially "saying with his or her dollars what needs should be met, what
objectives pursued, what values served."' 19 However, the current deduc-
tion has actually resulted in philanthropy's playing a relatively small role
in redistribution' 20 because only wealthy taxpayers determine the chari-
ties that benefit from charitable gifts.' 21 It is therefore not surprising that
the source of funding significantly influences the distribution of charita-
ble benefits. The private foundation is a common mechanism for making
charitable gifts by the wealthy and is a prime example of the power of
wealthy individuals to control the distribution of public funds. "[P]rivate
economic power is being deployed, often dynastically, through the de-
vice of the charitable foundation and the power it gives the founder and
the founder's family to select the objects of their charitable bounty and to
manage the charitable assets."' 22 Thus, "the distributional impact of the
charitable deduction should go beyond conventionally measured benefits
See also id. at 1914 (citing THOMAS SCHELLING. THE STRATEGY OF CoNFLicr 53-80 (1960) for
the proposition that people tend to settle on the solution that is most prominent or conspicuous
when solving problems as part of a group).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Tom Bethell, Welfare Arts, 53 PUB. INTEREST 134, 134-38 (1978) (arguing that arts
funding is no more than an income-transfer program for upper middle-class); Anne Lowrey
Bailey, Private Health Clubs Assail Tax Exemption of "Yuppie" YMCAs with Fancy Facilities,
CHRON. PHn.ANTHropy, May 30, 1989, at 1 (reporting accusations that YMCA seeks only
affluent members); William Vickery, One Economist's View of Philanthropy, in PHILAN-
THROPY & PUa. PoL'Y 31-56 (Frank Dickinson ed., 1962) (arguing that the role of philan-
thropy in redistribution is relatively slight).
121 See infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text discussing the point that low-income
taxpayers' preferred charities receive no subsidy for contributions. See also TERESA
ODENDAHL, CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME 3 (1990) (arguing that wealthy philanthropists divert
decision-making in the arts, culture, education, health, and welfare from elected officials to a
private power elite).
122 John G. Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, 5 PROB. LAW. 1,
5 (1978).
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to include the distribution of economic power" because the deduction
concentrates power at the upper-income levels.
123
Individuals account for the largest group of charitable donors, 124
and the higher an individual's gross income, the higher the amount in
charitable contributions. 125 Survey data show that less wealthy individu-
als donate a higher proportion of their income to charity. 126 Households
earning a relatively small portion of total income account for a dispro-
portionate share of all contributions. It would be logical to make the
reward for contribution proportional to the degree to which an individual
sacrifices. 127 The tax code, however, denies middle- and low-income
taxpayers any tax benefit. If We wish to encourage a generous rate of
charitable giving, we must reward those who give the greatest proportion
of their income.' 28
Individuals contribute to organizations that perpetuate their interests
and concerns, thus allowing these individuals to benefit, at least indi-
rectly,129 from their own generosity. Wealthy individuals tend to support
upper-class, "high-brow" programs such as public television, the sym-
phony, opera, museums, and theater.130 Equally important, wealthy indi-
123 CLOTFELTER, supra note 104, at 287.
124 GIVING USA 1995, supra note 39, at 47 (reporting that in 1994, living individuals
gave 80.9% of all charitable contributions in the United States which totaled $105.09 billion).
Charities collected approximately $8.77 billion (6.8%) through bequests. Id. at 59. $6.11
billion (4.7%) came from corporations. Id. at 77. Foundations made grants totaling $9.91
billion (7.6%) to non-profits. Id. at 63. Transfer tax provisions which permit a deduction can
be found in § 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code (the estate tax area), I.R.C. § 2055 (1996),
and in § 2522 (the gift tax area), I.R.C. § 2522 (1996).
125 C~oTFL'rER, supra note 104, at 20 (presenting 1973 survey data that covers both
itemizers and nonitemizers and shows that households contributing more than 20% of their
income accounted for only 11% of income but over 60,o of all contributions; households
accounting for 55% of income, however, accounted for only 8% of all gifts).
126 A recent survey revealed that "[w]hile a smaller proportion of lower income house-
holds than higher income households contributed, they gave a higher percentage of household
income to charity than higher income households." VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON & MURRAY S.
WEITZMAN, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 2 (1992). See also Lester M. Salamon, Social Services, in WHO BENENFTs FROM THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR? 134, 159 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992) (finding that giving is regres-
sive because the poor contribute a greater percentage of their income than the wealthy).
127 Paul McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contribution: A Substitute
for the Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377, 394 (1972) ("This seems to call for a
system which increases the reward as the individual sacrifices a greater portion of his income
to charity.").
128 Id.
129 See Rev. Rul. 78-232, 1978-1 C.B. 69 (disallowing a deduction if the donor receives a
direct benefit in exchange for a contribution).
130 ODENDA-L, supra note 121, at 16 (citing generally NATHAN WEBER, GIVING USA
1988 (1988)). See also Cro-mwrER, supra note 104, at 283; Wiedenback, supra note 41, at
101; Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II - The Impact
On Religious, Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 209, 224 (1975).
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viduals enjoy disproportionately these activities. 131 On the other hand,
the less wealthy tend to give to other individuals, 32 churches, profes-
sional associations, and community welfare organizations.133 Such char-
itable giving promotes pluralism.' 34 Unfortunately, relatively few
nonprofit organizations serve primarily poor- or moderate-income per-
sons.' 35 Some middle- and virtually all low-income taxpayers donate to
organizations that they consider likely to serve their needs - mutual aid
associations, 136 for example, and churches. 37 "Philanthropy and every-
day helping behavior are part of an informal mutual insurance
pact . . . [T]his kind of giving brings the benefit of potential return
aid."138
To some extent, then, charitable giving by high- and low-income
taxpayers alike may be founded on enlightened self-interest. But only
the self-interest served by charitable giving of high-income taxpayers is
subsidized. Unfortunately, the tastes and preferences of the high-income
group serve neither the needs nor interests of both a majority of Ameri-
can taxpayers and the neediest people of our society. Under the tax code,
the high-income group wields a disproportionate amount of power and
131 JULIAN WOLPERT, PATTERNS OF GENEROSITY IN AMERICA: WHO'S HOLDING THE
SAFETY NET? 7 (1993). See also Gergen. supra note 65, at 1446, 1446 n.186 (1988) (stating
that public television viewers tend to be high income taxpayers and suggests that the disparity
is even greater with regard to other cultural charities); Dick Netzer, Arts and Culture, in WHO
BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 174, 174 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992) ("The
creation of nonprofit organizations to produce cultrual services in the nineteenth century was,
in part, done to elevate and improve the working classes .... However, the redistributional
goal from the outset often was very secondary to the primary goal of establishing clubs to
make possible cultural experiences that would be enjoyed.., by the relatively educated and
affluent upper-middle-class.")
132 GIVING USA 1995, supra note 39, at 53.
133 CLOTFELTER, supra note 104, at 283; ODENDAHL, supra note 121, at 17.
134 See Gergen, supra note 65, at 1448 ("A deduction for gifts to social welfare chari-
ties.., has a desirable redistributive effect" and "[tihe benefit of a deduction to the needy, if it
increases giving, is likely to be enormous .... Any movement of resources far down the
income scale is likely to enhance aggregate welfare because a poor man will think more of
what a dollar buys than does a rich man"). But see ODENDAHL, supra note 121, at 17 ("But the
lack of funding ... of most middle-class and lower-class nonprofit ventures ... counteract
their concerted potential for power.").
135 See ODENDAHL, supra note 121, at 3 (citing Lester Salamon, et al., Partners in Public
Service: Government and the Nonprofit Sector in the Welfare State, in Working Papers 3-38
(Independent Sector and United Way Institute eds., 1986); WOLPERT, supra note 131, at 27.
See also Salamon, supra, note 126 at 159 (questioning the redistributive effect of private phi-
lanthropy's contribution to human services). "Compared to other segments of the nonprofit
sector, ... the human services agencies seem to focus more heavily on the poor, but... most
agencies focus primarily on the nonpoor, and most of the resources go to persons other than
the poor." Id. at 150.
136 See supra notes 173-194 and accompanying text (describing the tradition of giving in
African American, Asian American, and Latino communities as rooted in principles of recipro-
cal giving, sharing, and caring).
137 CLOTFELTER, supra note 104, at 37.
138 Id. at 37-38.
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influence in shaping institutions and their priorities. 139 On the other
hand, the Internal Revenue Code neither encourages nor subsidizes mid-
dle- and low-income taxpayers through the tax law, and it thus fails to
confer a benefit for the public good. Despite this redistributional para-
dox, the policy of preference can be altered by rewarding middle- and
lower-income taxpayers for their generosity. This change would en-
courage these taxpayers' gifts to charity, and it would be fair. It would
also be a sign that both the givers and the recipients are important - not
only as people who pay a substantial amount in income taxes, but also as
people who contribute to the common good and make our society a better
place. Thus, the tax law would permit self-interested micro-behavior
from which we all can collectively benefit and enlighten our society.
B. INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
Without a change in policy to promote enlightened self-interest, we
undermine the American ideal of equality of opportunity. At present, tax
policy reinforces power, influence, and inequality in our society, and
these elements of structural elitism pass from one generation to the
next.' 40 Even if we tolerate some inequality, we still must intervene on
behalf of the less wealthy and less powerful, for when we do, we check
cumulative inequality, which, unchecked, grows over generations. 141 I
am asserting that a Pareto-superior tax policy permits the same income
tax relief to low, moderate, and wealthy taxpayers. 142 Although the tax
deduction will not give low income taxpayers dramatically more after-
tax income, the marginal increase can, at the very least, be saved or
invested. 143
In absolute terms, the wealthy can contribute more to charity than
the poor, but the inequality in income cannot justify the wealthy's power
and influence. 144 More financial ability to give should not be a basis for
rewarding the rich for giving while ignoring the majority of tax return
139 See Simon, supra note 122, at 56 (quoting William Vickery: "The tastes and prefer-
ences of high income people... are permitted to exert an excessive influence .. "). See also
CLoaurLa, supra note 104, at 287 ("Charities and charitable activities supported by wealthy
people receive disproportionate encouragement.").
140 See generally Simon, supra note 122 (arguing that foundations help promote dynastic
wealth).
141 RAwLS, supra note 96, at 276. This purported check is in the form of transfer taxes.
142 See id. at 302. Pareto-superior tax policy is consistent with Rawls's Second Principle
of general equality and his goal of maximizing the financial position of those who are the
worse off.
143 The kind of investment I have in mind is investment in human capital to give children
access to education, health care, and culture - facilities which all contribute to uplifting peo-
ple and securing opportunity and dignity.
144 The common argument in support of the unequal treatment between high- and low-
income groups is that the wealthy actually give more in absolute dollar amount.
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filers who make charitable gifts. According to John Rawls, we can only
accept social and economic inequality if it raises the position of the worst
off and if it grants to everyone "fair equality of opportunity."' 145 Fair
equality of opportunity is not available to all taxpayers now because tax
relief for gifts to charity is only available to the taxpayers with higher
incomes.
Rawls's concept of justice seems to allow for inequality if, as a
result of the inequality, greater opportunity is enjoyed by those who are
not afforded the expenditure power. Thus, inequality is unacceptable
when the "expenditure power opportunity" afforded through tax relief is
denied to those of moderate or modest means.146 Whether this inequality
is acceptable turns on whether the benefits that are made available
through the generosity of the wealthy "trickle down" to the less wealthy.
But we know that contributions of the wealthy do not reach the "truly
needy"' 47 and that the bulk of charitable donations by the wealthy do not
reach most of the people whose incomes are far below the donor's in-
come level.148
In 1975, charitable gifts that were made to accomplish social change
or to assist the poor were meager compared to the charitable contribu-
tions of the wealthy to the arts, education, and the like. 149 Since 1975,
things remain much the same. Human services organizations are exper-
iencing a decline in individual contribution. 150 In 1994, for example,
giving to human service organizations was estimated at $11.71 billion -
a decline of 6.05%, the lowest level of giving to organizations since the
mid-1980s.' 51 From 1975 to 1995, giving to education, health and arts,
and culture and humanities increased by 8.51%, 6.46%, and 1.22%, re-
spectively.152 How do we explain this disparity in the two rates of giv-
ing? According to some studies, the nonprofit human service sector does
not target the poor, 153 and only a small portion of the agencies that serve
the poor provide basic necessities such as food, shelter, and financial
145 See RAWLS, supra note 96, at 302.
146 Id. at 303 ("All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth,
and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of
any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.").
147 See, e.g., Lisa Crooms, Don't Believe the Hype: Black Women, Patriarchy and the
New Welfarism, 38 How. L.J. 611 (1995).
148 See supra notes 131, 140, and accompanying text.
149 The Donee Group, supra note 32, at 58.
150 GivIN USA 1995, supra note 39, at 107, 180-81 (including in this category organiza-
tions that address public protection, employment, food for the needy, homelessness, public
safety, recreation, and youth development).
151 Id. at 26.
152 Id.
153 This fact is ironic; the human or social service area is the one area of the nonprofit
sector where one would expect to find "charity" that more closely parallels the dictionary's
definition of the word.
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assistance.154 Most nonprofit human service agencies focus on people
who are not poor, and most of the resources go to these people. 155 This
decline cannot be redressed at present because our current tax policy
does not encourage enlightened, self-interested giving to the truly needy
and, at the same time, denies to the poor an equal opportunity of expen-
diture power. Current policies encourage structural inequality by main-
taining the malredistribution of charity funds. Indeed, it appears that
historic maldistribution of income becomes even worse under our current
tax policy.
Consequently, high-income people have power, clout, and access to
resources that other people do not. The tax code favors this group over
citizens with dramatically less income. 156 I am not suggesting that phi-
lanthropists are not "genuinely civic-minded or do not do good a lot of
good for society. They are and do."' 57 My point, however, is that the
present system of philanthropy - aided by the tax law - reduces the
extent to which basic human services reach all Americans, especially
now, when this country faces a rapidly growing and more desperate need
for human services.
V. ENCOURAGING A COMMUNITY OF INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY
[T]he so-called "tax incentives" for charitable giv-
ing ... are so extravagantly discriminatory as between
poor and rich donors that for the social-action move-
ments they are effectively meaningless as a help in solic-
iting individual gifts.
The tax system as a whole is of no assistance in
enabling them to be self-supporting through the contri-
butions of their own members. Rather, it condemns
them to dependence on baronial benefactors.' 58
154 Estelle James, Commentary, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 244,
244-48 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992). See also WOLPERT, supra note 131, at 27, 38 (report-
ing that service disparities are least in the areas of health, education, and arts, and greatest in
the areas of social and welfare).
155 GIVING USA 1995, supra note 39, at 30 ("Though charitable giving increased soundly
in 1994, it was not necessarily allocated to the charities with substantial programs to help those
who cannot afford to pay for essential goods and services."); James, supra note 154, at 149.
156 See ODENDAHL, supra note 121, at 233 ("[R]ich people [do not] run all the private
cultural, educational, health and welfare organizations ... they do have the strongest voice in
many of the biggest, most prestigious enterprises and institutions."). See also ROBERT A.
DAHL, DmEMMAs OF A PLURALISTIC DEMoCRAcY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 47 (1982) ("The
unequal resources that allow organizations to stabilize injustice also enable them to exercise
unequal influence in determining what alternatives are seriously considered.").
157 ODENDAHL, supra note 121, at 183.
158 WALDEMAR A. NELSON, THE ENDANGERED SECTOR 164 (1979).
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It is a truism: The wealthy help themselves. 159 Not only is the cur-
rent tax policy driven by the people with money, power, and clout, but
tax policy also encourages welfare for the rich. This country must en-
courage the same kind of voluntary welfare between low- and middle-
income taxpayers. In the face of the growing need for human services,
voluntary transfers of wealth not only promote self-reliance but also en-
courage individual responsibility. In this way, we can change the truism
above to "I am my brother's keeper." Attention is most often focused on
the moderate- and low-income group as recipients of charity. In reality,
however, this group of taxpayers increases its giving each year. There-
fore, we must encourage individual responsibility by strengthening the
philanthropic potential of middle- and lower-income individuals. By
strengthening this group, we raise and direct more public money to meet
the greatest human needs. Any effort to strengthen giving in this group
will uncover centuries-old cultures of giving and sharing by people in the
middle- and low- income groups - groups that are ignored by main-
stream philanthropy and tax policy.1 60 The discourse on tax policy has
been directed by the wealthy and paid for by the disempowered. This
fact typifies Paulo Friere's "false generosity."'1 61 The result is that as
charitable giving and government benevolence decline, the truly needy
must become individually responsible and self-reliant. Is it a coinci-
dence, then, that as government benevolence is shrinking, multicultural
pluralism is on the rise? Shrinking government welfare and the rapid
growth of minority populations will undoubtedly change the historic bal-
ance of private generosity with public benevolence.162 The order of
things is changing.
America's demographics are changing, too. We are on the brink of
changing into a new society in which the majority of citizens are of non-
European descent.163 This demographic change will alter our culture,
159 See generally ODENDAHL, supra note 121; WOLPERT, supra note 131, at 27.
160 Cf. STEVEN L. PAPROCKI & ROBERT 0. BOTHWELL, CORPORATE GRANTMAKING: RA-
CIAL/ETHNIC POPULATIONS iii (1994) (encouraging corporate grantmakers to be responsive to
the public service initiatives of racial and ethnic populations).
161 FRIERE, supra note 74, at 26 ("Any attempt to 'soften' the power of the oppressor in
deference to the weakness of the oppressed almost always manifests itself in the form of false
generosity; indeed, the attempt never goes beyond this.").
162 James Joseph, Black Philanthropy: The Potential and Limits of Private Generosity in a
Civil Society 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
163 Barbara Vobejda, Births, Immigration Revise Census View of 21st Century, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1992, at A 10 ("By the middle of the next century, virtually half of the population
will be made up of blacks, Hispanics, Asians and American Indians and our terminology of
'majority' and 'minority' will be meaningless."). See also Joseph, supra note 162. Joseph
notes that, according to the World Development Forum,
if you lived in a representative global village of 1,000, 564 citizens would be Asian,
210 Europeans, 86 Africans, 80 South Americans and 60 North Americans ... 300
Christians (183 Catholics, 84 Protestants and 33 Orthodox), 175 Muslims, 128
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values, attitudes, and social vision, and these various groups will un-
doubtedly affect the way in which Americans meet social needs and
solve social problems. Each cultural group of Americans reflects its own
cultural beliefs and values in their philanthropic efforts. As such, gift
giving, financial assistance, sharing, and the distribution of wealth all
have cultural dimensions.' 64 We should recognize and acknowledge that
these diverse groups all have a history of philanthropy that enriches and
supplements165 the dominant philanthropic culture. 166
In what follows, I provide an overview of the culture of non-Euro-
pean people, a culture that I argue will shape our future social and tax
policy in America. To this end, I discuss African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Hispanics. I focus on these groups because immigration
trends and birth rates indicate that they will grow enormously and signif-
icantly exceed the population of the current majority. Furthermore, a
disproportionate percentage of low- and middle-income individuals rep-
resent ethnic minorities. 167
A. AFRICAN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY
African American traditions of benevolence and charitable giving,
as well as of self-help, date back to the early colonial era. Unfortunately,
historical accounts have largely ignored or diminished its importance.' 68
Hindus, 55 Buddhists, 47 Animist and 210 from other small religious groups or
atheists. Of these 1,000 people, 60 would control half the total income, 500 would be
hungry, 600 would live in shanty towns and 700 would be illiterate.
Id. COUNCIL OF FOUNDATIONS & ASSOCIATION OF BLAcK FOUNDATION EXECUTIVES, DONORS
OF COLOR: A PROMISING NEw FRONTIER FOR COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS iii (1993) ("U.S.
Census Bureau ... population projections indicate that by 2050 non-whites will comprise 49
percent of the population if the United States.").
164 See generally MARCEL MAuss, THE GIFr: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN
ARCHAIC SocIrY (Ian Cunnison trans., 1966) (1954).
165 See generally FOUND. NEws, May-June 1990 (providing complete information on the
role, status, and traditions of minority groups in philanthropy and vice versa).
166 See Marsha Jean Darling, We Have Come This Far by Our Own Hands: A Tradition
of African American Self-Help and Philanthropy and the Growth of Corporate Philanthropic
Giving to African Americans, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE NEw PoucY CONSENSUS: RE-
TREAT OF TE LIBERAL STATE? 121, 138 (1994) (arguing that the dominant culture reflects
white Anglo-Protestant beliefs about the relation of the individual to his or her property rights
which drive "ideas, values and choices about relationships between humans and humans, and
humans and the natural world").
167 In 1995, of the 13.8% of Americans who lived below the poverty level, 11.2% were
White, 29.3% African Americans, 30.3% Latino, and 14.6% Asian Americans or Pacific Is-
landers. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OFFICIAL STATISTICS (1995). See generally EDWARD N.
WOLF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA 11,
12, 17 (1995) (showing that the gap in the wealth between white and nonwhite households
increased between 1967 and 1987 and that any gain in wealth and income was enjoyed by the
upper half of the distribution rather than those who are less well off).
168 Darling, supra note 166, at 127. See also Emmett D. Carson, Despite Long History,
Black Philanthropy Gets Little Credit as 'Self-Help' Tool, Focus, June 1987, at 3-4; Charles
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Black benevolence and philanthropy grew directly out of the unique his-
tory of African Americans in the Unites States, and studies reveal that
the tradition of giving initially developed as a mechanism for survival.
As early as 1789, organized African American philanthropy formed self-
help mutual aid societies and fraternal orders to provide financial assist-
ance and services to free Blacks. The manumission aid societies pro-
vided assistance to freed slaves. These organizations provided resources,
skills training, a sense of community, and self-identity for Blacks. They
also helped socialize later generations. 169 Black voluntary associations
sprang up wherever a community of Blacks lived.'70 However, despite
their worthwhile functions, many states banned all Black "literary, dra-
matic, social, moral or charitable societies,"' 7 requiring benevolent or-
ganizations to operate in secret.
Importantly, while a few well-to-do Blacks were philanthropists, the
bulk of giving was made by poor and working-class African Americans.
Despite their meager resources, they accomplished a great deal - ex-
traordinary achievements considering the oppressive racism, paternalism,
poverty, and exclusion Blacks faced at the time.
Historically, the Black church has been the core of philanthropy in
the African American community. It received charitable gifts and gave
charitable gifts to individuals and other institutions. It was the moral and
political energy of the Black church that spearheaded the civil rights
movement.172
During and after Reconstruction, these organizations emphasized
self-help, participatory democracy, philanthropy, civic responsibility, and
social protest. They no longer focused solely on aiding individuals
within their immediate community. 173 Today, apart from the Black
church, African Americans have more institutional mechanisms for char-
itable giving, including black foundations and the private philanthropy of
B. Rangel, Charitable Giving and the Gross National Product, BLACK SCHOLAR, Mar. 1976, at
2-4. For a detailed discussion of African American self-help traditions and the development of
white philanthropy particularly in the black community, see Darling, supra note 166.
169 Darling, supra note 166, at 133-34 (citing John L. Rury, Philanthropy, Self-Help, and
Social Control: The New York Manwnission Society and Free Blacks, 1785-1810, 46 PHLYON
231-40 (1985)). See also EMMETT D. CARSON, A HAND UP: BLACK PHILANTHROPY AND
SELF-HELP IN AMERICA 20-21 (1993). Mutual aid and benevolent societies provided sickness
and disability payments, widow's support, and aid to orphans and to members and nonmem-
bers alike. Id.
170 Darling, supra note 166, at 132-33.
171 See CARSON, supra note 169, at 11.
172 See ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 41 (1990) (commenting that
the church was the first social organization controlled by Blacks in America and it was central
to the black community). See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN
THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988).
173 See generally David C. Ruffin, Not for Survival Alone, FOUND. NEws, May-June
1990, at 52-57.
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wealthy blacks - both which reflect significant assimilation of the Afri-
can American customs of giving.1 7 4 Moreover, African Americans are
substantial givers through federated campaigns. 175 Despite this historical
trend in charitable giving by African Americans, some Whites believe
that "African Americans are unwilling to participate in the processes of
hard work, frugality, self-help, and charitable giving that other upwardly
mobile groups acknowledge as legitimate and essential cultural val-
ues."' 176 Contrary to this perception, however, the legacy of self-help
plays a key role in the development of the African American community.
And if lawmakers really want a smaller federal government to accom-
plish more, then it seems that Congress, through the tax code, must
encourage individual responsibility and self-reliance in the African
American community. It can most effectively achieve this goal by ac-
knowledging the legacy of self-help 77 and by granting African Ameri-
can and all other low- and middle-income taxpayers an allowance for
charitable gifts.
B. AsIAN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY
Very little has been written about Asian American charitable giving.
Like the false perception of African American giving, there is the percep-
tion that Asian Americans are "takers and not givers."' 78 However, this
perception belies the charitable practices of the many subgroups 179 in the
Asian American community. The first generation of Asian Americans
came to this country in the 1800s from China, Japan, and the Phillip-
pines. After racially-based immigration quotas were lifted in the 1960s,
educated immigrants arrived and, after the fall of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, were followed by a great number of refugees from southeast
Asia. Each Asian American group brought a different custom and cul-
ture, but all experienced some form of prejudice and racism in this coun-
try.180 Their experiences and cultures have shaped their assimilation into
mainstream American culture and, to the extent that this assimilation has
174 Id.
175 See generally CATHIE J. WIrY AND JACQUELINE URLA, WORKPLACE GIVING: EM-
PLOYE ATTITUDES, PERCEPTIONS AND BEHAVIOR: INSTITUTE FOR NONPROITr ORGANIZATION
MANAGEmENT, (1989).
176 Darling, supra note 166, at 123.
177 See id. at 138 (citing shared and extended kinship, the common good versus the indi-
vidual good, and shared resources as a cultural ethos rooted in African First Principles which
are defined as a tradition of self-determination and universal human dignity).
178 ROBERT LEE, GUIDE TO CHINESE AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY AND CHARITABLE GIVING
PATTERNS 6 (1990).
179 The Asian American community is quite diverse. There are more than twenty groups
from Asia and the Pacific Islands. These groups speak different languages, observe different
customs, and come from different native cultures.
180 LEE, supra note 178, at 9-12.
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been slow, they now continue some of their ethnic-specific practices and
traditions.181
In spite of the cultural differences among the ethnic subgroups,
commitment to family and community are at the heart of philanthropy in
the entire Asian community. Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism pro-
vide the cultural framework of respect for elders, service, and compas-
sion toward all human beings. In the traditional patrilineal systems of
kinship and authority, the extended family primarily provides assistance,
self-help, and caretaking for individuals. 182 This social structure forms
the root of all Eastern Asian cultures.' 83 Every person expects that, at
some point, they will each be cared for by another. Thus, giving is a
ritual rather than sporadic "charity."' 84
Asian Americans give a substantial percentage of their income to
both Asian and non-Asian American organizations.' 85 This generous be-
havior toward Asian organizations may be influenced by the tradition of
supporting the family. 186 However, a greater sense of financial obliga-
tion to the family clearly does not reduce incentives to give outside the
family, for Asian Americans contribute substantially to non-Asian
groups - especially in education and federated campaigns.' 87
C. HISPANIC PHILANTHROPY
Like Asian American philanthropy, very little is also written about
Hispanic philanthropy. And like Asian Americans, Hispanics are cultur-
ally and racially heterogenous and make up a very diverse population. 188
As with African and Asian Americans, tenets of family-based self-help
permeate the Latino cultural tradition. Giving is perceived as sharing
rather than charity.' 89 However, the pattern of giving by Hispanics also
appears to be a reflection, in part, of how long they have been part of
American society. For example, Mexicans who have been in this coun-
try for many generations are more likely to give in formal ways - pri-
181 Id. at 12.
182 Stella Shao, Asian American Giving: Issues and Challenges (A Practitioner's Per-
spective), 8 NEw DIRECTIONS IN PHmLANTHROPIC FUNDRAISING 53, 56 (1995). For example, the
Chinese tradition dictates that the younger family members give support, care, and respect for
the older family members. BRADFORD SMITH ET AL., ASIAN AND HISPANIC PHILANTHROPY 30-
31 (1992).
183 See generally Shao, supra note 182, at 56.
184 SMITH ET AL., supra note 182, at 54. See also LEE, supra note 178, at 30.
185 Shao, supra note 182, at 53, 57-58.
186 See SMITH ET AL., supra note 182, at 27.
187 Id. at 59.
188 For purposes of this article, Hispanics in this country include Puerto Ricans, Cubans,
and Mexican-Americans.
189 SMITH Er AL., supra note 182, at 127-43.
[Vol. 6:325
PHILANTHROPY
manly through recognized organizations. 190  While those who have
resided in the United States for a shorter period of time give within the
tightly-knit family and through community groups, they also give to
political and charitable causes through organizations. 191 There is a sense
of familia, however, even with gifts to organizations. 192 It is clear that
the structures of support within the family are so important that they
undergird Hispanic organizational giving.
D. GIVING AS SHARING
The giving practices of non-European people are rooted in the no-
tion of giving as sharing with expectations of reciprocal sharing, not
"charity." Europeans had a similar practice of giving within ethnic
groups, but over many years shifted to more general areas of interest.
American acculturation and assimilation weaken "non-American" tradi-
tional practices over time. However, the ethnic minority groups dis-
cussed here have not completely assimilated into American "culture."
As a result, they may still prefer some individual giving over organiza-
tion giving. If so, then the tax code should recognize this fact, as well as
the fact that nonwealthy Americans - minority and majority alike -
substantially contribute to the common good.
While it appears that Hispanics prefer individual giving over organi-
zation giving, other ethnic minorities favor workplace giving over gen-
eral giving. 193 These minority groups are a potential source of a general
increase in giving, but the increase will happen particularly in the work-
place if appropriate solicitation strategies and incentives are used. Mi-
norities rate health and human services as the greatest priority for giving
in the workplace. 194
Substantial potential for giving and efficiency in workplace giving
campaigns developed and finally became the United Way, a federation of
charitable organizations that was created by local business leaders. It
ultimately became an annual billion dollar fundraiser for local chapters.
Traditional federations such as the United Way have declined in popular-
ity because of the way they have allocated their charitable dollars. 195
190 Id. at 126. Prior to 1848, much of the southwest where Mexican immigration occurs
belonged to Mexico. Development of the railroads, which provided jobs after the turn of the
century, spawned a surge in the Mexican-American population. During the 1930s, many Mex-
icans were repatriated to Mexico, and Mexicans who were citizens were often expelled during
the Depression and post-World-War-II era. Id. at 124-25.
191 SMITH ET AL., supra note 182, at 126-27.
192 Id. Even Mexican donors who have lived in this country for many generations indi-
cate in surveys that their giving was motivated by a sense of family. Id.
193 Wrrry, supra note 175, at 22.
194 Id. at 13.
195 Liz Spayd, United Way Donations Drop for Second Straight Year, WASH. Post, Dec.
11, 1993, at BI.
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The federation historically excluded nontraditional, "controversial," or
minority groups and women's agencies from membership by limiting the
donors' choices about the allocation of their contributions. It is this ex-
clusivity that gave rise to alternative workplace fundraising. The growth
of federations opens up new opportunities for individual giving by many
more less wealthy individuals that reaches well beyond the immediate
community. 196 Philanthropy coupled with an appropriate tax policy that
responds to all income levels can encourage positive attitudes about the
need to value, protect, and support community programs. 197
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT DEDUCTION
The deduction is deemed inefficient and unfair, and it fails to pro-
mote pluralism. Thus, we must look at possible substitutes for the de-
duction. Such alternatives include: a policy of matching grants;
nonitemizer deduction; refundable credit; and nonrefundable credit for
gifts to organizations that are dedicated to fighting poverty.
A. MATCHING GRANT
A matching grant policy permits a donor's gift to be matched by a
grant from the government that goes directly to the charity the taxpayer
designates at a predetermined amount. 198 All classes of income would
receive the same relative benefit because the matching grant would not
be dependent on the taxpayer's income. Proponents of the current tax
policy, however, argue that the deduction promotes pluralism. The fact
is that the current deduction only promotes pluralism at the upper-income
levels - that is, high-income individuals control how public funds will
be spent. On the other hand, a matching grants policy promotes mul-
ticutural pluralism because all tax return filers who make donations
would generate a matching grant.
While the matching grant would eliminate unfairness in the distribu-
tion of the subsidy, there are other fundamental questions. Under the
196 GIVING USA 1995, supra note 39, at 49. It is recognized that specific kinds of "ask-
ing" affect giving preferences. Being asked to give by someone the potential donor knows or
by the clergy are the methods that most likely lead to a contribution. Media reports of poverty
rank just below being asked by the clergy as a reason for giving. Id. at 49-50.
197 COUNCIL ON FOUNDATIONS & ASSOCIATION OF BLACK FOUNDATION ExEcurnvs, Do-
NORS OF COLOR: A PROMISING NEw FRONTIER FOR COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS iii (1993) (The
"dramatic change in the demographic makeup of the United States will pose an opportu-
nity... to all community foundations. In order to continue building permanent endowments,
community foundations should begin thinking about developing strategies to attract donors of
color."); WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 21 (survey indicating that giving can be increased if more
people are asked to contribute, volunteer and have access to payroll deduction plans in the
work place).
198 McDaniel, supra note 28, at 378.
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Establishment Clause' 99 of the United States Constitution, Congress can-
not aid religion. Whether the government's matching grants policy
would run afoul of the Constitution is an unresolved issue. Thus far, the
Court has determined that property tax relief for religious institutions
does not violate the First Amendment.200 Under a matching grant policy,
the question might turn on whether the Court considers such grants the
"functional equivalent" of a tax deduction.201 If the grant functions like
a deduction, then perhaps the Court would find that it does not violate the
Constitution. In contrasting the tax expenditure with a direct-money sub-
sidy, the Court's analysis in Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York rested on
the amount and continuing nature of the government's involvement with
the religious institutions: "Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a
relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental
grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administrative
relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards,
but that is not this case.' '202 Even if a system of matching grants is the
functional equivalent of a tax deduction, however, the question remains
whether the system involves more government "entanglement" with reli-
gion than is required for a tax expenditure. 203
Proponents of the matching grant anticipate that a switch to grants
would continue to induce giving at a level commensurate with the cur-
rent deduction.204 But it is not clear that matching grants would result in
individuals increasing their contributions. It is apparent, however, that
given the discrete patterns of giving of high-, middle-, and low-income
individuals, a system of matching grants is certain to change how people
allocate charitable gifts.
Some fear that matching grants invite political intervention.20 5 For
example, political intervention was on display with the politization of the
public funding of the National Endowment for the Arts and Senator Jesse
Helm's critique of the artistic choices of some Americans: "The is-
199 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
200 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (considering local property
tax exemption for churches).
201 Boris Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28
TAx L. REv. 37, 40-41 (1972); McDaniel, supra note 28, at 409-11.
202 397 U.S. at 675.
203 Izzo, supra note 65, at 2395; Bittker, supra note 201, at 41 ("It is barely possible that
some of the [religious institutions'] social welfare activities could be split off sufficiently to
gain separate a constitutional status for matching grants... .
204 McDaniel, supra note 28, at 403.
205 Bittker, supra note 201, at 45 (arguing that administrative and Congressional manipu-
lation could compromise donor privacy and institutional independence because protected in-
formation would lose statutory privacy protection).
1997]
356 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:325
sue.., really is... indecency and rottenness, homosexuality, sodomy,
bestiality." 206
Whether a system of matching grants is constitutional and free of
political manipulation are major issues that are both related to substitut-
ing the matching grant for the deduction.20 7
B. NONITEMIZER DEDUCTION
A nonitemizer deduction permits a charitable contribution deduction
for those taxpayers who cannot itemize.20 8 However, the individual who
contributes but does not earn enough to have a tax liability still receives
no tax allowance with a nonitemizer deduction. Congress designed the
standard deduction to allow a certain level of personal expenses, includ-
ing an unspecified amount for charitable gifts. However, when we allow
a charitable contribution deduction for nonitemizers, we effectively cre-
ate a double deduction for such contributions. 20 9 The double deduction
is the result of the taxpayer's getting both the standard deduction and the
charitable contribution deduction.
The deduction for nonitemizers represents a substantial improve-
ment over the current system for many taxpayers. Yet such a deduction
provides no allowance to taxpayers who lack taxable income.210 More-
over, like the current deduction, the deduction for nonitemizers still
grants a disproportionate subsidy for individuals in the high tax bracket.
Finally, the nonitemizer deduction is costly if Congress does not corre-
spondingly reduce the subsidy it provides to upper-bracket taxpayers.21'
C. REFUNDABLE CREDIT
A refundable credit benefits taxpayers because it grants the same
level of tax allowance for all taxpayers and makes the after-tax cost of a
gift to charity independent from income. The credit would be equal to
the amount of qualified contribution multiplied by a percentage that
would at least maintain the current revenue cost of the expenditure.2 12
Presumably, a revenue-neutral credit would not reduce aggregate giving
206 Izzo, supra note 65 at 2394 (citing Patti Hartigan, Senate Rejects Helms's New NEA
Restrictions, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1991, at 25).
207 See WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 29 (arguing that if the federal government transfers
responsibility for the safety net to the states, localities, and charities, it should take steps to
help these entities bear the increased responsibility of reducing the cost of giving).
208 In 1986, when nonitemizers could take a full deduction for their charitable gifts, they
gave about $4 billion in a single year. Independent Sector Press Release, May 23, 1996.
209 Pearlman, supra note 109, at 1140.
210 But see supra notes 60-61 and acompanying text.
211 Pearlman, supra note 109, at 1140 (noting that the effect on tax revenues of a repeal of
the nonitemizer deduction would be substantial: revenues would increase by an estimated
$419 million in 1986 and $2.687 billion in 1987).
212 See, e.g., Izzo, supra note 65, at 2398-99, 2398 n.127.
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to charities. Empirical studies on price elasticity across income levels
are contradictory. 213 But if price elasticity is constant and the credit is
revenue-neutral, aggregate giving should be unchanged. While it is un-
clear whether a credit would change aggregate giving, it would affect the
allocation of contributions. 214 Churches and community organizations
would gain with a refundable credit.
D. NONREFUNDABLE CREDIT FOR GIFrs TO POVERTY RELIEF
ORGANIZATIONS
In 1995, Representatives Joseph Knollenberg (R-Mich.) and Jim
Kolbe (R-Ariz.) introduced House Bill 2225.215 The bill would create a
non-refundable 100% tax credit for up to $100 per taxpayer per year
($200 for joint filers) for donations to charities that are engaged in help-
ing low-income Americans.216 The legislation converts a tax liability
into a charitable donation.217 The bill assists individuals who earn 15%
or less of the poverty line and ensures that the contributions go to an
organization that serves the poor, not the Kennedy Center National Sym-
phony Orchestra. Under the bill, the charitable organization can spend
no more than 30% of its aggregate expenses on administration, fundrais-
ing, lobbying, and litigation. Any contribution above the credit limit
would be tax deductible.
This legislation allows individual taxpayers to decide how a portion
of welfare dollars, is spent. Under it, "people will have to ask the ques-
tion: Do I want my dollars to go to a Washington bureaucracy or to the
homeless shelter down the street?" 218 This nonrefundable credit would
significantly impact overall giving to organizations which directly serve
the poor. It would redistribute income of taxpayers at all income levels
equally for gifts to qualified poverty relief organizations, and it would
encourage giving by all taxpayers. It also treats each taxpayer identi-
cally. Taxpayers who are closest to the grassroots are among the 87 mil-
213 Id. at 2399; Wiedenback, supra note 41, at 101. See also supra notes 111-14 and
accompanying text (explaining contradictory studies on the constancy of price across income
levels).
214 See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
215 H.R. 2225, 104th Cong. (1995) (popularly known as the Choice in Welfare Tax Credit
Act of 1995).
216 Low-income is defined in the bill as 150% of the poverty line or below. Currently,
this amount would be $11,205 for one person and $22,725 for a family of four. Id.
217 Individuals claiming the credit would be required to indicate on their tax return the
amount given and the identification number of the organizations to which they contributed.
This amount would be subtracted from their tax liability.
In keeping with revenue neutral rules, the Earned Income Tax Credit would be simultane-
ously repealed. Whether the Earned Income Tax Credit should be repealed is not addressed
here.
218 Robert Sirico, Giving a Boost to Private Charity, WASH. TiMms, June 1, 1995, at A21.
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lion Americans who cannot itemize their deductions. This measure
would allow taxpayers to direct a portion of their taxes to programs in
their own communities. However, taxpayers who do not earn enough to
have taxable income would not receive an allowance. Religious charities
- including churches - would qualify if they have specialized minis-
tries that serve the poor.219
While this legislation has some appeal, several important concerns
arise. Determining how an organization administratively uses the funds
would be a problem. No standards exist. Organizations could classify
administrative expenses as program expenses to meet the 70% threshold.
Furthermore, other nonprofit organizations may well suffer loss in dona-
tions because the credit is targeted to organizations that predominately
serve the poor and may create a deeper divide between the poor and the
rest of the community. Equally significant, many national charities that
fight poverty do not limit their services to just the needy and thus may
not qualify as donees for the credit. Neither would colleges, universities,
and a host *of other charitable organizations that do not target the needy.
The bill also imposes an administrative burden. It requires addi-
tional record keeping by taxpayers220 and adds to the Internal Revenue
Service's cost of verifying relatively small amounts. 221 But taxpayers
are already required to maintain records of their contributions. 222 And if
we had a meaningful tax allowance for donations to qualified charities, it
would probably encourage record keeping by taxpayers who do not al-
ready have the need to keep records of their donations. 223 For those tax-
payers who already itemize deductions, this requirement would impose
no additional burden. The Internal Revenue Service uses standard verifi-
cation methods that are adequate to detect fraudulently reported
contributions. 22
On the other hand, the additional cost of compliance raises a legiti-
mate issue. The record keeping requirements for eligible organizations
would change significantly. Organizations would be required to docu-
ment income levels of people they serve to ensure that most of these
219 Religious-based organizations would qualify if they set up a 501(c)(3) organization
that is dedicated to providing services to the poor.
220 See Clotfelter, supra note 109, at 284 (stating that the burden is especially onerous for
low- and some middle-income taxpayers).
221 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (Costs associated with taxpayer substantia-
tion and Internal Revenue Service verification were reasons for repealing the nonitemizer
deduction.).
222 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(a)(1), (a)(2)(I) (1995) (as amended) (requiring taxpayers to
substantiate donations by cancelled check, receipt from the donee, or "other reliable written
records").
223 See Brown, supra note 110, at 389 (commenting that taxpayers who receive no tax
allowance for charitable gifts have little incentive to maintain accurate records of such gifts).
224 See Izzo, supra note 65, at 2400-01, 2401 n.143.
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people are poor. Most organizations do not currently maintain such
records. However, the benefit of no longer denying a tax allowance to the
millions of taxpayers who have no voice in the allocation of public fund-
ing outweighs any new administrative burdens.
The matching grant proposals have been criticized because they are
vulnerable to political intervention.225 A similar concern is raised with
the legislation. The Internal Revenue Service would, under the choice in
welfare legislation, continue to determine the qualifications of organiza-
tions for the appropriate tax exempt status. Thus, under this bill, no
greater opportunity exists than that which already politicizes the process
of deciding which organizations would qualify.226 The concerns cannot
easily be dismissed - even when balanced against the benefit of no
longer denying a tax allowance to the millions of taxpayers who have no
voice in allocation of public funding, the concerns cannot easily be dis-
missed. The nonrefundable credit for poverty relief is worthy of consid-
eration, but it offers an inadequate solution for tax purposes. Issues of
distributional equity, discrimination against nonitemizers, and unfair al-
location of power all remain for gifts in excess of $100 that are donated
to organizations other than those dedicated to fighting poverty.
VII. CONCLUSION
Millions of lower- and middle-income individuals already give to
charity. They support activities that directly benefit other people on the
lower end of the income scale. It is abundantly clear that the need for
individuals to support the public interest is growing rapidly and, more
specifically, even greater support is necessary for these people because
the government safety net has been steadily disappearing since the late
1970s. Encouraging contributions by people who give to organizations
that help create, develop, and support opportunities for less affluent peo-
ple is a step toward providing a "starting advantage. ' 227 Among lower-
and moderate-income taxpayers, such contributions could create a vast
constituency for charitable organizations by freeing them from depen-
dency on the wealthy.
225 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
226 See Izzo, supra note 65, at 2393.
227 James Tobin, Considerations Regarding Taxation and Inequality, in INCOME REDIS-
TRIBUTION 127, 131 (Colin Campbell ed., 1977). See also Robert Woodson, Dismantle the
Poverty Panopticon: Anti-Poverty, ProCommunity, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1995, at A16 (argu-
ing that, in order to achieve decreased governmental intrusion and a return of authority to self-
governing citizens, not only must federal programs be reduced or eliminated, but policies must
be created that support and promote grass-roots programs of mutual assistance). Woodson's
view is consistent with the stated philosophy of the Contract With America which asks rhetori-
cally, "Isn't it time for the government to encourage work rather than rewarding dependency?"
GINGRICH ET AL., supra note 11, at 65.
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Charity needs to be "uncoupled in the public mind from the idea of
private advantage and privilege and reunited with its purpose of serving
the public welfare. 2 28 Providing the same allowance for gifts to charity
from taxpayers without regard to the taxpayer's income is a step in the
right direction. 229
Granting the tax relief to middle- and lower-income individuals that
is now provided to the wealthy not only provides distributional equity,
but is good social policy.230 The value to charity lies both in the addi-
tional financial support and the voluntary efforts of the donors.2 31 More-
over, "if charities are to be given additional responsibilities because they
can do a better job than government, they should be helped, not
hindered." 232
We must face the magnitude of the America's social problems.
Eliminating social welfare programs without creating policies that en-
courage mutual support will not change people's lives. 233 Changing peo-
ple's lives requires that people believe in their ability to build and sustain
organizations and institutions in their communities that counter the cor-
rosive effects of malignant neglect and stereotypes of indifference and
dependency. Money channeled to neighborhoods through community-
based and grass-roots organizations could help reduce the growing
problems of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. 234 People very much
want to contribute their fair share - if they could find a way to do it
effectively. "A lot of people actually see more of a result from the
money they give to private organizations: It's closer, it's local, they feel
involved."235 Taxpayers who are closest to grassroots groups are among
the millions of Americans who contribute, but who cannot claim a de-
duction for their contribution.
228 ALAN PIFER, PHILANTHROPY IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 86 (1984).
229 See WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 29 (stating that if the federal government transfers
responsibility for the safety net to the states, localities, and charities, it should take steps to
help them bear the responsibility of reducing the cost of giving).
230 See Tobin, supra note 227, at 131 ("Unequal prizes are won in a fair race. But if the
starting advantages in the next race are correlated with the order of the finish of the last one, is
opportunity equal? Is the race really fair?"). There is a need to encourage redistribution of
income indirectly through the tax laws. Cf. Wallis, supra note 95, at 135 (arguing that expan-
sion of social programs eliminated the need for the tax system to redistribute income).
231 See HODGKINSON & WEITZMAN, supra note 126, at 28 (1995) (showing a correlation
between making contributions and volunteering).
232 WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 29.
233 Casey, supra note 14, at Al (quoting Glenn Bailey, who runs soup kitchens in Utah
without government support: "[I]f [the government] really wanted to get people off welfare,
[it would] ... provide incentives so, when people do pull up their socks, they're rewarded.").
234 See WOLPERT, supra note 12, at 27 (arguing that most charitable organizations which
provide for the needy are local, community-based, home-grown, and reflect secular or reli-
gious values; they have the infrastructure to do more than they do now).
235 Casey, supra note 14, at A4 (quoting Billy Shore, director of Share Our Strength,
which is one of the country's largest food distributors).
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Tax law is a basic institution that shapes society and must serve the
public good. How can the tax system be changed to serve the interest of
society, promote the general welfare, and encourage diversity in the ways
we achieve social objectives? An equitable tax system that encourages
and affirms charitable giving by the wealthy and non-wealthy alike
would be a good place to start.

